报告题目：Signaling Quality Information in Initial Coin Offerings with Fund Regulation
报告所属学科：管理科学与工程
报告人：薛巍立（东南大学）
报告时间：2021年6月2日 14:00-17:00
报告地点：将军路校区经管学院702室
报告摘要：
Initial coin offerings (ICOs) are a new fund raising way based on blockchain technology. Under ICOs, ventures can issue tokens to investors to raise funds and promise that the future product can be paid only by tokens. However, quality information asymmetry and cash diversion risk are major issues in ICOs, which will lead to project failure for ventures. This paper considers how the fund regulation influence the venture’s signaling strategy and profits. Specifically, we consider two types of ventures producing high or low-quality products, respectively, and the quality information is privately known. Ventures should decide their token size for ICO stage and the token denominated price of the product. The token price is determined by market clearance condition. We show the conditions when separating and pooling equilibria exist and study when ventures will signal their quality information. For example, we find that ventures are more likely to target informed investors when fund regulation is loose and distort token size to achieve separating equilibrium when fund regulation is strict. Interestingly, we find that under complete information, a more strict fund regulation makes ventures more profitable, however, under information asymmetry, the fund regulation can hurt the venture’s profit and lead distorting separating disappears when token liquidity is low.
报告人简介：
薛巍立，东南大学经济管理学院教授、博导，东南大学“仲英青年学者”；中国自动化学会经济与管理系统专业委员会会员，中国管理现代化研究会运作管理专业委员会会员等。 主要从事数字经济环境下的运营与决策优化、供应链物流管理、服务运营管理等。发表SCI/SSCI论文40多篇，包括Management Science、Operations Research、Production and Operations Management、Decisioni Science、Transportation Science等国际知名期刊；主持了包括国家自然科学基金优秀青年科学基金在内的多项国家级和省部级项目。
